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Résumé / Abstract
 Les industries-réseaux (télécommunications, électricité, gaz naturel,
services postaux, services d’aqueduc et d’égouts, etc.) font face à de sérieux
problèmes dans leur transition vers la concurrence. Dans cet article, je rappelle
d’abord quelques faits et principes avant de discuter des procédures par lesquelles
la concurrence peut être introduite, à savoir les règles et conditions d’accès aux
réseaux. Je compare la règle de tarification efficace des composantes, la règle de
Ramsey et la règle du plafonnement global des prix et je montre que cette dernière
peut être la réponse à plusieurs des questions soulevées dans la recherche d’une
approche efficace à la transition vers la concurrence. Je poursuis avec la
présentation d’un mécanisme d’enchère qui pourrait aussi permettre le
développement ordonné de la concurrence. En conclusion, je rappelle divers facteurs
généralement négligés mais néanmoins importants.
Many network industries (telecommunications, electricity, natural
gas, postal services, water and sewage services, etc.) are confronted with
significant logistic and behavioral problems in their transition towards
competition. In this article, I first recall some general principles and
fundamental facts and issues before proceeding with the basic procedures
through which competition can be introduced in telecommunications markets,
that is the access pricing rules. I compare the efficient component pricing rule,
the Ramsey pricing rule, the global price cap rule, and show how the latter could
in fact be an answer to many of the concerns and questions raised in the search
for an efficient way to introduce competition in telecommunications markets. I
then continue by presenting some recent research on network access auctions,
a possible approach to increasing competition with soft or light-handed
regulation. I then conclude by raising some neglected albeit important issues. 
Mots Clés : Réglementation, concurrence, télécommunications
Keywords : Regulation, Competition, Telecommunications
JEL : L51, L86
1 Introduction
Coming back from Japan, China and Hong-Kong last November, I was
surprised by a magazine article claiming that 60 per cent of the adult
population in the world today has never made a phone call and that
for another 15 to 20 per cent, making a phone call remained a dicult
enterprise. Given the tremendous interest that the revolution in telecom-
munications is generating among and around us and given the signicant
potential in productivity gains that it promises, it may be useful to keep
in mind that this revolution, its characteristics and its consequences are
still unknown for a very strong majority of the human population. There
is clearly a large part of the world which is still in need of some very basic
communication systems. Indeed, one of the main challenges confronting
the telecommunications industries is and will be for some time to link
a vast majority of human population to the international telecommuni-
cations network. It is therefore extremely important that we nd new
and more ecient ways to develop and implement telecommunications
networks in order to achieve the global village which has been announced
as a virtual fact. It is clearly not yet the case. And this symposium is
not unrelated to the more global objective of achieving complete inter-
connection in the near future. How can this be done ? At what cost ?
Through what kind of institutional and organizational structure ?
Many network industries (telecommunications, electricity, natural
gas, postal services, water and sewage services, etc.) are confronted with
signicant logistic and behavioral problems in their transition towards
competition. In some of those industries, this transition is already more
or less achieved while in others, it is still a project rather than a reality
even if pressures to achieve such a state of reasonable competition are
mounting. It is believed that a competitive structure is the only way to
credibly incite rms to provide eorts in minimizing costs and to oer
to their clients and customers the best adapted products to their needs.
On the other hand, when dierent providers of goods and services are
intensively engaged in a competitive process, it becomes dicult to en-
sure that an adequate level of coordination is taking place in order for
the industry to benet from economies of scale which are external to
the rms but internal to the industry. In the network industries, these
economies of scale may be very important on specic well-identied es-
sential links of the network. Those are subject to monopolization: they
are essential inputs and would be ineciently provided if more than one
producer was involved. If there ever existed natural monopoly sectors,
these essential network links are thought to be the perfect examples.
Increasing competition in such network industries, of which the tele-
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communications industry is the front runner, raises important questions:
what are the reasonable and workable competition structures ? What
are the characteristics of the appropriate coordination mechanisms which
would ensure that the potential scale economies are realized ? Given the
reality of essential facilities subject to important scale economies, how
can we achieve the proper competition among networks through the de-
termination of conditions of access to the essential links ? What are
the characteristics of ecient transition policies, that is, policies which
are capable of counteracting the tendencies of the regulated monopo-
lies to overestimate the diculties of creating a manageable competitive
framework ? Should the transition be gradual or brutal ? Should it
be done through a stage of exible and incentive regulation ? Can we
dispense with the regulatory framework in favor of a more general com-
petition policy and antitrust framework ? These are questions which are
confronting the telecoms industry and the telecoms observers today.
The problem of designing an optimal or ecient set of institutions for
developing a proper competition level over time among service providers
and between networks is a dicult task. Up till now, the drastically sim-
plifying assumptions under which its analysis has been done make the
results dicult to implement and therefore its messages remain rather
poorly understood by the regulators and many telecoms observers. Al-
though the existing systems of regulation was designed in a theoretical
context which by now is in disrepute and signicantly challenged by the
new theorists, it is still very much pervasive in the regular discourse of
practitioners. It is very important to explicit the underlying assump-
tions under which the design of institutions and the characterization
of the mechanisms by which the transition towards competition will be
implemented. In that sense, there is still a need for basic and theoret-
ical research into both the new regulation of telecommunications and
the potential eects of relying more and more on the application of the
competition and antitrust laws. Moreover, translating the results of the-
oretical research into a workable set of institutions and procedures which
can be well understood by the dierent parties is both demanding and
challenging. Few institutions are designed to tackle such a task which
requires a ne equilibrium between managers, researchers and political
analysts. This may be one reason why it is so dicult to reduce the
time lag between research ndings and their implementation: rst, the
researchers may not value that much the implementation of their ideas
and results and second, the practitioners may be too preoccupied to
maintain the well known and mastered institutions and procedures by
which the regulation of network industries is achieved now. We then end
up with a set of procedures and institutions (organizations, rms and
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markets) which may be tractable and manageable but which are not ca-
pable of generating the level of static and dynamic eciency which more
adequate procedures and institutions could generate.
Let us recall what are the characteristics which a proper competition-
generating institution design should eventually discuss and tackle [Laf-
font and Tirole (1994), Economides and White (1995), Armstrong, Doyle
and Vickers (1995)]: the determination of the nal consumer prices; the
nature and modes of competition in product and services markets; the
level of market power (and mode of competition) over dierent links
in the network; the level of dierentiation among the products being
sold to consumers over the networks; the potential and real extent of
bypass, that is, competition among the networks; the possibility of of-
fering xed or common conditions of access combined with variable or
discriminatory conditions for dierent network users; the possibility of
variable entry and exit by service providers over time; the incomplete
(dierent and private) information structures and the specic incentive
system that regulators, network operators and service providers are re-
spectively facing; the dynamic factors and forces present in the industry
and generating or dependent on learning-by-doing and innovations. A
demanding research program by any standards.
My paper is divided in four parts. In part I, I cover some general
principles and fundamental facts and issues which have in part been
already mentioned by others in dierent contexts. Then I will proceed
with the basic procedures through which competition can be introduced
in telecommunications markets, that is the access pricing rules. I will
compare the ecient component pricing rule with the Ramsey pricing
rule. Then I will discuss the global price cap, what it is and how it could
in fact be an answer to many of the concerns and questions which have
been raised for some time in the search for an ecient way to introduce
competition in telecommunications markets without losing the benets
of important economies of scale and scope. I will continue by presenting
some recent research on network access auctions which is a relatively
new idea put forward by two of my colleagues and myself as a possible
approach to increasing competition with soft or light-handed regulation.
I will then conclude by raising some issues which have been relatively
neglected but remain nevertheless important issues.
2 Basic principles and fundamental issues
Let me just recall what the general principles and fundamental facts,
issues and concerns are. It is important to restate those here so that
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we can better dene and understand the basic problems which bring us
together to analyze the telecommunications sector.
First, institutional and organizational design (coordination and in-
centives) is a major problem of human societies. The observed move-
ment of reform towards market-based system economies, outsourcing and
downsizing in business and governments, and deregulation and incentives-
based regulation, are all parts of a recent realization and increasing con-
sensus that those coordination and incentives mechanisms are a major
determinant, factor and driver of social eciency and social well being
in human organizations and more generally in human societies.
Second, ineciencies in organizations may creep up, even if all mem-
bers are honest, hard working and law-abiding citizens. This is well
illustrated by the costs of telecommunications before price caps were
introduced or competition introduced. Saying that organizations are
inecient or that costs are too high does not mean that this is done
deliberately. It may be done in a very honest way. People do not know
how far they can go in reducing costs, unless they are forced to do it,
and this is something which is forgotten in many discussions about the
role of regulation or deregulation.
Third, given the diculty to go after the true cost of an activity, the
role of government and regulators is basically to set up a proper envi-
ronment for decision making rather than to intervene into what may be
called micro management. Basically the role is to set up an environment
in which decision making can be made ecient.
Fourth, the development of the regulatory framework, in telecommu-
nications in particular, was done in a period where there was a huge
need for stability. Demand was in formation. People were learning how
to use telecommunications. There were lots of network externalities to be
mined and technology didn't oer as much possibilities for introducing
competition. This have clearly changed now.
Fifth, technology and industry seems to be abreast and ahead of what
academics and regulators are thinking. In a sense, current academic re-
search becomes more or less obsolete before it is nished because of the
fact that practice and technology have changed by the time the research
is completed. This occurs in particular when we want to pinpoint and
be too specic about regulatory actions. Therefore, our research eorts
should be more in terms of framing or characterizing the proper envi-
ronment in which decision-making in those industries would be made.
Sixth, it seems there is no other way to build an ecient telecommu-
nications system today than to bring in competition. It is not clear how
you could do it otherwise. So how can that be done? Well, the rst step
is to allow access by competitors to some essential facilities. This is the
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basic problem. Access pricing and conditions to essential facilities are
the major procedure or the major problem we should tackle.
One cannot simply put in place organizations or rules without rst
considering and understanding their implications in terms of coordina-
tion patterns and procedures and of incentives for social and economic
performance, both static and dynamic. Many of the problems we are
facing are basically linked with those coordination and incentives prob-
lems, and it is important just to restate again and again what these
problems are, where they come from and how they play a crucial role in
institutional and organizational design.
Before looking more precisely at the telecommunications business, it
may be useful to stress at the outset that these problems and issues are
not peculiar to the telecommunications business. Indeed, the analysis
of coordination and incentive mechanisms, both from a normative point
of view and a positive one, may be the unifying paradigm underlying
microeconomics and the economics of growth, if not of all social sciences.
Let me mention two other problems currently facing all modern societies,
the social security and welfare reform and the fundamental dynamic
problem of economic growth.
In Canada as well as elsewhere in the developed world, the reform
in the social security system is basically a coordination problem and an
incentive problem. The social security and welfare systems of the recent
past and present have become over time less and less ecient because
of organizational malfunctions both internal and external. Social se-
curity and welfare personnels in large enough numbers have developed
routines and habits which may have been desirable in the past but are
now ill-adapted to the current working and needs of the labor markets
and of society as a whole. Social security and welfare recipients in large
enough numbers have learned to use the system in distorted ways by
modifying their behaviors in order to privately prot from the system,
not as a security and insurance system but as a regular and predictable
source of income and benets. Although at the beginning of the cur-
rent reform eort such perceptions and objectives were present in some
ocial documents and public interventions, the emphasis was quickly
put on dierent issues, namely the need to reduce government decits
and the `vested rights' of people to the traditional comprehensive social
protection system. The former is clearly an unrelated problem while
the latter is a lack of exibility (incentives) problem: the tragedy of
public decits is not that they exists but rather that they are incurred
for the wrong reasons, namely because of consumption habits, political
inexibility and unprotable public investments rather than for produc-
tive investments capable of generating directly or indirectly the revenues
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necessary to nance themselves. In so doing, we lost contact with the
more fundamental coordination and incentives problems which the so-
cial security and welfare system had created. Nevertheless, it is through
the theory of coordination and incentives that we can understand better
what this whole reform is or should aim at. Both the economists (and
other social scientists) and the politicians have a lot of selling eort to
make in order to convince the people of such a fact. But surprisingly,
those better equipped to do it seem absent from the public debate on
these issues.
As for the problem of growth, it is surprising that economists have
for so long looked for mechanistic models of how economies can grow in
order to characterize the paths, ecient or not, through which growth
occurs. The recent renewed interest in endogenous growth, with its em-
phasis on externalities in human capital and knowledge (technological
patterns) capital, leaves aside for the most part the institutional and
organizational `capital' of a society. Growth is more a matter of this lat-
ter capital than of anything else since, as the recent histories of Eastern
Europe, Asia and Africa have demonstrated, the quantity and quality
of human capital and/or of technology are not sucient factors to ex-
plain or generate growth although they may be useful, indeed necessary,
factors to reach higher growth paths. Moreover, these traditional fac-
tors, human capital and technological patterns, are better understood as
products of institutional and organizational capital, that is, of coordi-
nation and incentive mechanisms generally present in the society being
considered. It is not clear how formal models of growth incorporating
measurement of the quantity and quality of this capital and of its evo-
lution over time could be developed but one may hope that they will be
in the near future so that a better understanding of the determinants of
growth can be achieved.
Incentive constraints come basically from asymmetric information
on some characteristics of particular situations. Herbert Simon, the
Nobel Prize winner in economic science, said that the major problem that
organizations are facing today is to overcome the fact that information
is proprietary. It is now common among economists to consider two
basic objects of this private information, namely the private information
on characteristics (for example, on technological characteristics or costs)
leading to adverse selection, and the private information on actions (for
example, on eort) leading to moral hazard. Both forms are major
problems in organizations. For instance, it is quite dicult to observe
the economic prots (not the accounting prots) and their sources in an
organization. Similarly, it is quite dicult to observe the eort level and
structure in generating those prots, in choosing the right investments, in
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self-protection and self-insurance activities across the organization. But
the eciency of the organization depends on its capabilities to overcome
these information problems possibly more than on any other factor. A
society is more (or less) ecient in its use of the scarce resources it
controls when its organizations are more (or less) ecient in solving
the coordination and incentives problems generated by the asymmetric
information structure.
Coordination is also a major issue. A proper level of coordination is
necessary in particular to determine the proper level and characteristics
of investments in telecommunications. Are markets sucient for this?
Most probably not, for two reasons. Those investments are very spe-
cic investments and they relate to design attributes. Therefore, there
is a signicant possibility that they will become stranded and that small
errors in synchronization and complementary matching will generate ma-
jor losses, unless an ecient form of coordination is achieved. Moreover,
economies of scale and scope are an important feature of telecommuni-
cations technologies. In many cases, the market will by necessity remain
an oligopolistic market in which too much duplication should be avoided.
Again, important gains can be achieved by having an extended form of
coordination. It is not clear how this coordination can be obtained in
an ecient way without allowing or inducing the rms to collude. It is
clear however that the regulatory process has been one way to more or
less make these investments in some form of coordinated way. Market-
based investments in developing networks may not be as successful as
regulated investments have been in the past unless proper coordination
is achieved.
It is useful to see the problem of regulating or reforming regulation of
telecommunications as a coordination and incentive problem. Although
for many years, lawyers, managers, regulators and economists have been
ghting among themselves over the proper way to generate a normal
rate of return in the traditional rate of return regulation structure or
framework, we know now that many of the costs which were incurred by
telephone companies were not necessary in spite of the fact that we have
been mostly convinced for many years that they were in fact minimum
costs. These were the costs on which the rates of return were computed.
When price caps were introduced in Great Britain about 10 years ago,
costs decreased rather rapidly. When competition was introduced in
Canada in the long distance market, Bell Canada and other Stentor
companies found that they were overstaed and that at least a good
chunk of their costs could be avoided. Before a rm gets into a more
incentive system, it seems very dicult for it to nd that out. This is
the starting point for the analysis of global price caps and auctions in
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the next section, as ways through which ecient decision-making could
be achieved.
Unless an economy can count on a very ecient telecommunications
system, rms in that economy will have problems to compete on the
world markets. That may not have been the case up till about 10 years
ago. Low cost communications were important but `not vital', that is,
rms could survive and prosper even if costs of communications were,
say 10 or 15 per cent above what they should or could be. The telecom-
munications industry was maybe less vital in that sense than it is today.
Therefore, the pressure to get to the lowest cost possible has increased.
Ownership structures have been advocated also as one way to reach
this proper level of competition. The U.S. 1984 split between long dis-
tance and local exchange companies was an attempt to control the owner-
ship structure in order to generate enough competition. Here in Canada
more recently, Sirois and Forget (1994) advocated that we should split
the network operators from the provider of services over the network.
In this way, the dierent technologies which represent dierent networks
could compete with each other and the service providers would compete
with each other over the dierent technologies. By splitting the own-
ership structure, we make sure that a proper level of competition will
likely emerge. Sirois and Forget very strongly advocate against duplicat-
ing the dierent technologies. So these satellite operators would not like
to compete against another satellite operator (fearing a Bertrand-like
destructive competition) but would not mind about competing against
the other technologies. Here, the way to bring in competition would be
through restricting ownership structures and opening the networks to all
service providers on level playing eld conditions. Again, the basic prob-
lem to overcome for the regulators is the determination of access pricing
and conditions over the dierent networks. More fundamentally, it is
our rather poor understanding of the competition forces which would be
at work in such a context that constitute the major stumbling block to
the adoption of such an approach.
3 Access pricing rules
The telecommunications industry is regulated because of the important
economies of scale present in the network activities: it would make little
sense to let two similar parallel networks exist and oer similar products
and services. But if there exist important economies of scale in providing
the services of the network itself, the situation may be quite dierent
regarding the activities, goods and services oered over that network.
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Hence the possibility of separating the network itself from the goods and
services `travelling' over it. Moreover, it is possible and quite likely that
the network economies of scale are important over some links but not over
all the links. For the latter links, market forces should lead to an ecient
number of parallel links insuring that a proper level of competition will
emerge. Those links over which the economies of scale are important
are the essential facilities and duplication is either not feasible or not
economically meaningful. Hence, access to the essential facilities must be
regulated in some way to prevent the owner from exercising market power
and predatory self-dealings in cases where the essential facility provider
is also active on the competitive links and/or in the provision of goods
and services travelling over the network. How should the access pricing
and conditions to the essential facility be regulated ? The objective of
regulation here is two-fold: to make sure rst that the proper goods and
services are produced and oered at a proper price to the consumers
and second that the rms allowed to use the essential facility be those
rms which are the most ecient in using it. Ideally, it should be in the
best interest of the owner of the essential facility, when it is also present
in the complementary competitive markets, to allow these most ecient
rms to have access to the essential facility even if this means allowing
the entry of more competitors in previously monopolized or oligopolized
markets. Finally, the regulation rules should discourage the entry of
rms which would be less ecient in using the essential facility. What
are those rules ?
The ecient component pricing rule [The ECPR: Willig (1979), Bau-
mol (1983), Baumol and Sidak (1994)] and the Ramsey pricing rule [Laf-
font and Tirole (1994)] are two approaches to nd the proper regulation
rules to attain an ecient allocation of resources and an ecient ac-
cess to the essential facility in particular. They have been more or less
opposed to each other in the literature. However, some authors [Arm-
strong, Doyle and Vickers (1995)] have advocated recently that the two
approaches are in fact two sides of the same coin even if for some time, the
ECPR was considered as suering mainly from very restrictive assump-
tions and the Ramsey pricing rule was considered as suering mainly
from very demanding information gathering. In spite of their internal
consistency and powerful theoretical propositions, the translation of ei-
ther approaches into real and operational institutions has been less than
satisfactory at this time. One reason may be that the suggested proce-
dures and rules to make their results operational has been too closely
related to the formal models themselves. We may need here a new ap-
proach in which the institution design stage of the research program is
given more importance and follows a kind of stand alone development.
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It is most likely that the institutions by which theoretically ecient al-
locations are achieved will have little resemblance with their theoretical
representations.
Let us just recall briey what those access pricing rules are. The
objective of the Laont-Tirole Ramsey pricing is global eciency. It
is not an entry issue. It aims at making sure that the proper goods
are produced and that we would create as small distortions in produc-
tion as possible from the rst best allocations, which would have been
characterized in the usual way. It says that the margin over marginal
cost should be proportionate to the inverse of the superelasticities in
the dierent markets or the dierent goods. To apply Ramsey prices,
you have to know or have an evaluation of those superelasticities which
is something requiring a lot of information on demand systems. The
Baumol-Willig ECPR has the objective of allowing ecient entry under
`given', possibly regulated, nal prices which rule out monopoly rents.
If it is not the case, the rule itself would not generate a fully ecient
allocation of access to the essential facility because the pricing of nal
products and services might be monopolistic rather than competitive or
ecient. This nal prices issue is an important one in practice because
of the diculty for the regulator to x unilaterally those prices. Baumol
and Sidak (1994) advocated for xing nal price ceilings according to
some measure of stand alone costs, more precisely of stand alone cost
of a hypothetical entrant. This may be dicult to assess in practice.
To prevent predation, the incumbent would also be required to satisfy
price oors determined by marginal (incremental) costs. The objective
of the ECPR is to make sure that the access rules to the essential facil-
ity do not allow inecient or less ecient rms to enter the market for
goods and services using the essential link of the network as an input
but at the same time do not prevent the entry of any rm which may
have the capability to be more ecient than the incumbent in using the
essential facility itself. It is important to control the power of the in-
cumbent to block systematically the entry of those more ecient rms.
In that sense, it is a cost based rule. But as we will see, its validity as
a normative rule is limited when a budget balance constraint is imposed
on the incumbent and its apparent simplicity and therefore superiority
over Ramsey pricing rules can be challenged when more realistic cases
are considered.
According to the ECPR, the access charge (and other conditions)
should be the direct cost of access plus the incumbent's opportunity cost
of giving access to competitors, that is, in the notation of Armstrong,
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Doyle and Vickers (1995),
a = C
2
+ [P   C
1
];
where a is the cost of a unit of access, C
2
is the marginal (incremental)
cost incurred by the incumbent for giving access to a rm, P is the given
price of the nal (homogeneous) product, and C
1
is the incumbent's
marginal cost of production. This opportunity cost P   C
1
is basically
the displacement of the incumbent's market plus possibly a contribution
to the cost of the social obligations to serve, if this is considered as
being a social responsibility of the incumbent rm. The displacement
of the incumbent's market translates into a loss of variable prots for
the incumbent. Given the nal prices optimally set (by the regulator)
to eliminate monopoly rents, the reduction of the incumbent's variable
prots (revenues minus variable costs) implies that the incumbent's xed
costs would not be covered anymore. Hence, the new entrant should be
able to cover this loss in variable prots, not as a tribute to the incumbent
but as an eciency condition. Regarding the contribution to the cost of
social obligations (a form of dierentiated product sold at a loss by the
incumbent who has to recuperate the loss from the protable sectors of
the market) imposed on the incumbent, again the reduction in variable
prots would make the incumbent unable to fully cover the cost of those
obligations. Hence the requirement that the entrant contributes to those
social obligations unless the contribution can be considered as part of
the loss in variable prots. The rule has two important properties: rst,
it sends the right signal to potential entrants since only the more ecient
entrants will nd it protable to enter and second, the incumbent being
fully compensated does not object to the entrant's use of the essential
facility (at least in the static non strategic context considered).
The opportunity cost or displaced market for the incumbent can be
evaluated in dierent contexts, from the relatively simple case above,
which was the original case in which the ECPR was proposed, to more
and more complex and realistic cases. As we go from the simple case to
the more realistic case of product dierentiation, bypass, uncertainty in
demand, input substitution, multiproduct rms and multiaccess (entry
in the network at dierent points or nodes), the evaluation of the incum-
bent's opportunity cost becomes more and more complex. Those factors
will in general reduce the opportunity cost of access for the incumbent.
Consider product dierentiation. If the entrant oers a new product
dierent from the products oered by the incumbent, the displacement
of the incumbent's market becomes more dicult to evaluate because the
new sales of the entrant are not necessarily lost sales by the incumbent.
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Hence, an entrant producing a dierentiated product may increase wel-
fare by generating diversity even if it is less ecient than the incumbent.
In the extreme case of independent products, the entrant has no impact
on the incumbent's market (absent income eects) and therefore, the
ECPR would x the access price at the direct cost of access only. More
generally, substitution factors must be evaluated in order to determine
the level of access charge, making necessary a rather detailed knowledge
of demand conditions.
Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1995), following an approach pro-
posed by Laont and Tirole (1994), have shown that in such a general
context, the proper evaluation of the opportunity cost for the incumbent
of providing access is a rather complex issue. For instance, in a context
where a competitive fringe of entrants with each one supplying a simi-
lar product but dierentiated from (and substitute to) the incumbent's
product, where some bypass possibilities exist and where there are in-
put substitution possibilities, the equilibrium fringe nal price will be
increasing with the incumbent's nal price and the cost of access. In
fact, the output x and price p of the fringe and therefore its demand
for access z and its impact on the incumbent's variable prots are all
directly determined by the incumbent's nal product price P and access
price a thanks to the assumption of a purely competitive fringe (if the
entrants have market power, the problem is somewhat more dicult).
The incumbent's output increases with the access charge (
^
X
a
> 0) and
decreases with its own product price (
^
X
P
< 0) while the fringe's output
and demand for access decrease with the access charge (x^
a
< 0, z^
a
< 0)
and increase with the incumbent's nal product price (x^
P
> 0, z^
P
> 0).
When the budget balance constraint of the incumbent is not binding, the
optimal access charge is based on the opportunity cost obtained as the
product of the incumbent's marginal prot per unit sold and of the ratio
of the marginal impact of an increase in access charge on the incum-
bent's output and the marginal impact of this increase on the demand
for access by the fringe, that is,
a = C
2
+ [P   C
1
];
with
 =
^
X
a
 z^
a
:
When the budget balance condition is binding, the optimal access charge
should be increased by a third term (besides the two terms of the simple
ECPR), namely the price elasticity of the fringe's expenditure on access
times the multiplier factor of the budget balance condition  = (

1+
),
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that is,
a = C
2
+ [P   C
1
] +
z^
 z^
a
:
The last term is of course due to the possibility of relaxing the budget
balance constraint of the incumbent by taxing access. More generally, for
the multiproduct and multiaccess case of an incumbent producing N nal
products and supplying M access services (or nodes), the access pricing
formula for the m-th access service is, with straightforward notation,
a
m
=
@C
@z
m
+
N
X
n=1

mn

P
n
 
@C
@q
n

+
X
i6=m

mi

a
i
 
@C
@z
i

+
z^
m
 @z^
m
=@a
m
;
where the sum of the second and third terms represent the loss in vari-
able prots by the incumbent when it supplies a marginal unit of access
of type m. The last term is added because of the budget balance condi-
tion imposed by the regulatory procedure. It constitutes in a sense the
dierence between the Ramsey pricing (the four terms above) and the
direct application of the ECPR (the rst three terms above). Clearly, a
proper evaluation of all these terms and formulas would require a lot of
informations on demand and cost conditions.
It turns out that both the ECPR and Ramsey pricing have been pro-
posed and sometimes used as tools aimed at obtaining in the telecommu-
nications sector an ecient allocation of resources, ecient entry, and
ecient production of the right goods for the consumers. Both of them
are informationally very demanding. They are very complex in realistic
cases and they are open to manipulation, to regulatory capture and to
predatory behavior because of this complexity and because of the fact
that there is so much uncertainty or imprecision in the estimates of the
basic parameters or basic variables you have to obtain and know to apply
them and because of the fact that generically, the information structure
on costs and demands is incomplete. The latter factor creates an incen-
tive problem which is sidestepped by the analysis. In fact, they may be
more open to manipulation, regulatory capture and predatory behavior
than we have thought before. This is a major drawback. Hence the need
for a more information-ecient approach.
4 Price caps and global price caps
Such an approach may be the Laont-Tirole global price cap (GPC)
designed to consider explicitly those information requirements. As ex-
pressed by Laont and Tirole, the two main advantages of GPC is rst
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to follow theoretical precepts and second to require no more informa-
tion than the other schemes such as ECPR, the Ramsey pricing rule,
or the long-run incremental costs of access with or without proportional
markups la Allais. The global price cap considers both the nal prod-
ucts and services prices and the access charges in one single price cap
formula. Once the price cap is determined, the incumbent rm is free to
choose its prices, including the access charges, as long as the global price
cap is satised. The rm implements the Ramsey price structure if it
knows its demand and cost functions. There is no need for the regulator
to nd and measure as before those demand and cost conditions and
elasticities.
The role of `regular' price caps has been basically to introduce high
powered incentive mechanisms in regulation. A price cap rule allows the
regulated rm to vary its prices as long as some index of those prices is
satised, that is, is not higher than some benchmark. Given that the
regulator controls only an index of prices, it is believed that the benets
of letting the rm choose an adequate price structure and adequate cost
reduction activities would then remain with the rm itself, at least in
the short or medium run. Hence, the rm is incited to adopt ecient
production technologies and to provide the ecient eort levels to reduce
costs and increase eciency.
The notion of global price caps brings access in the basket of goods
sold by the rm. So selling access on the market would be one of the
goods in the basket on which the regulator would dene the price cap.
The rm is then free to determine the price of access and the price of the
other goods and services it sells, as long as the index of those prices is
below the cap which is imposed by the benchmark. One of the interesting
characteristics of these global price caps is that they would implement
Ramsey pricing in a decentralized fashion. The prot maximizing prices
chosen by the regulated incumbent within the global price cap constraint
are the Ramsey prices. The argument goes as follows [Laont and Tirole
(1995)]. Let (p) and S
n
(p) denote the rm's prot and the consumers'
net welfare for price vector p. A social welfare maximizing rm subject
to a budget constraint would maximize (p) + S
n
(p) subject to the
constraint (p)  0. That is, it would maximize (p)+S
n
(p) for some
 2 (0; 1]. When increasing price p
i
by one unit, a prot maximizing
rm ignores the impact ( q
i
) on the net consumer surplus, where q
i
is the demand for good i. On the other hand, a prot maximizing rm
subject to price cap
P
w
i
p
i
= w p  p maximizes (p)+(p w p and
therefore chooses the proper relative prices if the weights are exogenous
and proportional to the realized outputs. So the regulator does not
have to nd those prices. The rm does it and it indeed will nd in its
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best interest to apply Ramsey pricing to its dierent products including
access. The simple but important condition for the procedure to achieve
this remarkable result is that the weights on this global price cap be
properly selected by the regulator, that is, be set equal or proportional
to the expected amount or quantity sold of those dierent goods and
services, including access, sold by the rm. In a dynamic setting, the
proper weights may be achieved by using the previous period observed
quantities. The procedure would then converge to the optimal weights
and the global price cap would achieve its objective.
Therefore, the regulatory scheme would let the incumbent owner of
the essential facility compete also in the competitive markets or sectors
and select the prices as long as the price cap is satised. The rm would
have the incentive to be ecient in terms of cost reduction and to price
the dierent goods at their Ramsey level and, therefore, assure minimum
distortions from the rst best rule. This is a characteristic which is quite
interesting. We now have a little bit of experience with price caps so this
would just extend somewhat the role of those price caps in creating the
right environment, particularly in telecommunications. The problems
with implementing this procedure are the usual price cap problems: rst,
the valuation of the X factor and the regular revision of price caps, and
second, the possibility of predatory behavior by the incumbent or the
owner of the essential facility.
The solution to these problems could be to dene and base the global
price cap on an index of prices in the telecommunications business out-
side the area of the rm itself. For Canada, for instance, you would
need some kind of index of deregulated prices in other countries, prices
over which the Canadian telecommunications sector or the Canadian in-
cumbents have no power. These outside prices would be used basically
to reect the X factor. Global price caps could allow the rm to exert
predatory behavior by raising the cost of access and lowering the cost
of nal goods to satisfy the price cap and at the same time to prevent
entry. There is here a clear role for the Competition and antitrust laws
and the Competition Bureau. Their specic role would be in fact to
prevent this predatory behavior through the usual tools.
5 Auctioning network access
Let us now turn to another approach to determine access conditions, the
allocation of access through auctions of parcels of capacity of the essen-
tial facility. One possible way to do it would be to run an auction to sell
access and possibly rerun this auction regularly so that new rms can
15
come in while the already established rms have to compete for access
as they have to compete for any other primary or secondary factor or in-
put for production of their goods and services. The best known auction
in telecommunications is the recently held auction of spectrum rights
for Personal Communication Systems (PCS) by the Federal Communi-
cations Commission in the U.S. This was a relatively complex auctions
of a non standard product. Executives of telecommunications rms and
regulators learned to play this complex auction game and according to
most participants and observers, it turned out to be a real success. This
is likely to raise or revive the interest in regulation through auctions.
The following discussion borrows heavily from a paper by Jacques
Robert, Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne and myself [Boyer, Robert and Sinclair-
Desgagne (1995)]. The basic approach calls for the characterization of
optimal access allocations given constraints imposed by the unavoidable
existence of private information on cost and other characteristics, by
capacity concerns and by revenue concerns. So the rst step is to de-
sign and characterize the conditions of ecient allocations. To achieve
this, we considered an environment where rms in an oligopolistic down-
stream market must have access to a primary upstream input in order to
market dierentiated products sold directly to consumers. The primary
input, here interpreted as access to a network and more precisely to the
essential link or facility, is produced by a `regulated' natural monopoly.
The essential facility or network link may be a local exchange network in
telecommunications industry, a transmission network in electric power
industry, a pipeline network in natural gas industry, a local network of
pipes in the water distribution and sewage collection industry, a local
routing network in mail and messages delivery industry, etc. Let us as-
sume the existence of a regulator whose somewhat non-standard role will
be to determine the characteristics of network access allocation rules and
also design the environment inducing the rms and other institutions to
realize such an allocation.
For the purpose of clarity and simplicity, we considered a specic ac-
cess problem giving rise to the problem of deriving characteristics which
an ecient access formula, procedure or rule must satisfy in this par-
ticular context. The problem of access conditions is a mechanism de-
sign problem and ultimately the access conditions should emerge as the
outcome of a system composed of rms and institutions and of their
designed interactions. As the title of our paper suggests, we consid-
ered how auctions may be substitutes to the standard access pricing
regulator-determined rules and procedures.
The challenge for the regulator is to set up a mechanism by which
at most Q capacity units of the network is properly allocated and by
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which the xed cost of the network C is recovered completely or as
much as possible, that is, at a given or endogenously determined level.
Such a regulator must care about how capacity is distributed among
rms (for reasons of cost eciency), about the prices charged by these
rms to their customers (for reasons of allocation eciency), and the
total revenue generated to pay for the network (for reasons of a public
budget constraint or for reasons of a social cost of public funds due
to distortionary taxation). Moreover, the regulator must operate in an
incomplete information structure in which lots of useful informations are
private to the individual rms in the market.
An allocation rule wished and/or induced by the regulator must spec-
ify the following, given the various characteristics of the dierent rms
(actual and potential) in the industry: the prices, the quantity produced
by each rm and their respective payments for accessing the network.
Because the regulator cannot control all the actions of the rms nor
observe their respective characteristics, he will need to allow for some
exibility. His problem is to design an incentive system or mechanism
that will induce the best outcome (in expected terms). In what follows
we shall consider the optimal mechanism that the regulator can imple-
ment, under asymmetric information, through a proper design of the
environment that decision makers (rms and other organizations and in-
stitutions) will be facing. The optimal regulatory mechanism is therefore
the one which maximizes social welfare subject to constraints relating
to demand conditions, capacity conditions, revenue requirements, and
incentive compatibility.
If the social cost of public funds  is strictly larger than 1, the reg-
ulator prefers to minimize the rms' prots and to increase their access
fees to nance the cost of the network rather than doing it through di-
rect subsidies. The regulator should leave no rent to the least ecient
rm whose technology parameter is denoted by 
i
, that is, U
i
(
i
) = 0,
and some distortions away from the ecient allocation need to be intro-
duced. The presence of asymmetric information limits the regulator's
ability to fully extract all the rms' prot because rms are expected to
use their private information in a strategic way. Incentive compatibility
implies that U
i
(
i
) = E

 i
[
R


i
Q
i
(
 i
; s)ds]: the informational rent of
the more ecient is a function of the prots they would make if they
were pretending that their costs were high. In order to limit these rents,
the quantities allocated to the least ecient rms is reduced. Relatively
to the ecient allocation, rms produce less and these distortions are
greater for less ecient rms. The solution to the constrained regula-
tor's problem must then be implemented through a proper procedure or
institutional design.
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A rst procedure analyzed by Boyer, Robert and Sinclair-Desgagne
is to determine two part access charges, a xed one and a variable one.
The per-unit access price plus a rebate proportional to total revenue
will incite rms to select the optimal prices while the xed price insure
incentive compatibility (rms will reveal through the auction their tech-
nological characteristics). Firms face a menu of access charges, the xed
part increasing with revealed eciency and the variable part decreasing
with revealed eciency.
An alternate procedure is to set up an auction for access rights. The
idea is that a rm would be asked to bid for access according to a function
of the amount of access it will get and the amount of access other rms
are going to get on the network. Access would then be allocated by the
regulator or the network owner and payments for access would be made.
The rms are then free to choose their prices, but a rebate on the amount
paid for access is announced on the basis of the market share a rm can
achieve. In this way the rms, looking for the rebate based on market
shares are induced to choose and implement the Walrasian equilibrium
prices.
In a particular case with 2 rms, i and j, the implementation of the
ecient allocation could be achieved using an auction which correspond
to the Groves mechanism for this case. Participants must reveal a lot
of information (but information they are likely to have) to the auction-
eer/regulator but he, in return, needs no particular information to put
the mechanism in place. The mechanism is as follows:
 Each rm submits to the auctioneer a system of preference, R
i
(Q
i
; Q
j
)
which states how much it is willing to pay to have the quantities Q
i
and
Q
j
allocated. The value [R
i
(Q
i
; Q
j
)   R
i
(Q
i
  1; Q
j
)] corresponds to
i's willingness to pay for an extra access unit; while [R
i
(Q
i
; Q
j
  1)  
R
i
(Q
i
; Q
j
)] measures its willingness to pay in order to reduce the access
of her competitor.
The regulator allocates access so as to maximize [R
i
(Q
i
; Q
j
)+R
j
(Q
i
; Q
j
)]
subject to the capacity constraint. If (Q

i
; Q

j
) are the quantities allo-
cated, then rm i pays [R
j
(Q

i
; Q

j
) R
j
(0; Q

j
)] to the auctioneer.
 Afterwards, the mechanism follows the following rules: rms select
their prices; restrictions are imposed on rms' access only if total demand
is above the total quantity allocated, in which case, access is provided
according to the guarantees purchased, that is, Q
i
and Q
j
; nally, rms
receive a rebate equal to
R
1
p
i
Q
i
(x; 
j
)dx.
Boyer, Robert and Sinclair-Desgagne show that, under the above
strategic environment, rms will submit their true willingness to pay so
that the nal allocation will correspond to the one desired by the regula-
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tor. The above mechanism can be interpreted as an auction system where
bids are contingent on the access allocated to the other participant. So
what we have is a use of auctions for regulating access to a network
in the following context: rms in an oligopolistic (downstream) market
seek access to a primary input held by a regulated natural monopoly
(the upstream rm). In this context, socially optimal access conditions
are determined as a function of downstream rms' privately-known char-
acteristics and dierent ways to implement the optimum were looked at.
They suggested that allocating and determining access through properly
designed auction procedures could in many cases prove as ecient as the
standard access pricing approach and in some cases more ecient.
In this context, two important classes of auctions - share auctions
and multi-item auctions - may prove fruitful to study in more details.
Examples of share auctions in the economic world include the sale of
newly registered stock in the Paris Bourse, the sale of oshore oil leases
in Indonesia, and occasionally the weekly auctions of U.S. government
bills. Overall, however, auctions of shares remain relatively uncommon.
The relative unpopularity of share auctions can be explained by at least
two features that put them at a disadvantage with respect to other types
of auctions [Wilson (1979)]. First, share auctions often yield sale prices
that are lower than those obtained in other auctions. Second, share
auctions are plagued by numerous bidding equilibria.
When the objective is to maximize social welfare and the value of
public funds is low, the rst feature may not be too bothersome. The
price is then only a transfer from downstream rms to the upstream
rm. Furthermore, lower access prices may enhance participation in the
downstream market, which in some industries such as telecommunica-
tions may mean increased variety in contents and consequently greater
consumer welfare [Sirois and Forget (1994)]. On the other hand, lower
access prices entail an accrued risk that the xed cost of the network
will not be covered.
One apparent advantage of share auctions in the context of network
access regulation is that they address the Coasian criticism that xing
the access price precludes the upstream rm from learning about the
shape of the demand for its capacity [Laont and Tirole (1993)]. In a
share auction, demand for capacity can easily be computed by summing
up the downstream rms' submitted demand schedules. These demand
schedules, however, may not be true ones. This is where the second
feature of share auctions hits badly: there can be many equilibrium
congurations of individual demands, besides the one involving truthful
demand schedules. One way to possibly overcome this could be to invite
bids from a better informed rm, for instance by allowing the upstream
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rm to enter the downstream market. Intuitively, since the upstream
rm internalizes the cost of access, it can adopt a bidding strategy that
deters non truthful demand schedules on the part of downstream rms.
An alternative to the auction of shares in the present context is the
multi-item auction. Auctions of this sort have gained much popularity
and relevance lately, especially in the context of network access regula-
tion, after one was successfully used by the U.S. Federal Communica-
tions Commission to sell spectrum licenses for personal communication
services [for detailed descriptions and analysis of this auction, see McMil-
lan (1994) and Cramton (1995)]. Multi-item auctions have also been used
recently in Europe for the privatization of state-owned rms. In a multi-
item auction, the network capacity would rst be split into subunits of
possibly uneven size and characteristics. These subunits would then be
sold simultaneously to downstream rms through one of the standard
auctions (i.e., the rst-price sealed-bid auction or the English auction).
Interesting issues here concern the design of the subunits and whether
or not to allow "bundling", that is the acquisition by a downstream rm
of more than one subunit [see Branco (1995) for a recent analysis of this
latter issue].
Multi-item auctions present many advantages over share auctions.
First, they would usually yield higher revenues to the seller. (The auc-
tion used by the FCC brought billions of dollars to the U.S. Treasury.)
Second, they allow the regulator to deal directly with heterogeneous ca-
pacity (the FCC had to distinguish between dierent types of narrow
bands) or to implement redistributive or regional policies through the
discretionary design of the subunits. They are, however, less informa-
tive than share auctions about the shape of demand for capacity.
The analysis of Boyer, Robert and Sinclair-Desgagne suers from sev-
eral important limitations. First, the equivalence between a pricing sys-
tem and an auction system relies on the fact that there is no uncertainty
about the demand system. There exists a literature about the respective
benets of allocating resources through prices or through quantities [for
example Weitzman (1974)]. This issue, an important one in practice,
was side-stepped. Second, private information on the part of the natural
monopoly was also assumed away. This is in sharp contrast with the lit-
erature on regulation and incentives. Taking into account the upstream
rm's information would have required to consider double auctions but
again this may prove to be quite fruitful. Third, the implementation of
the optimal regulatory rule requires extensive knowledge by the regula-
tor of the structure of the demand system and the distribution of types.
This is of course unrealistic. Ultimately, the objective is to nd simple
and straightforward auctions that could induce the desired allocation
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and could be put in place without presuming so much knowledge from
the regulator. Finally, some of the costs intrinsic to using an auction
were not made explicit here. Holding an auction presupposes that all
interested parties are somewhat brought together at a given time. This
imposes high coordination costs on the potential bidders and the auc-
tioneer. Moreover, in the present context, some downstream rms are
likely to be wanting to abandon their access to the network after some
time whilst new rms express a concrete interest. To deal with those
situations, the auction would have to be repeated relatively often. One
way to decrease the frequency of repetitions could be for the regulator to
sell options on the access to the network rather than real access. There
is indeed much to be done.
6 Conclusion: some neglected issues
Some neglected issues should be raises in conclusion. The standard pro-
cedure of introducing competition in telecommunications markets has
been to give some advantages to entrants. This has been quite often
advocated to raise competition because of learning eects and brand
name eects. How long should those last and how to make this duration
credible ?
New competition is redening risks and aect investments and net-
work developments and maintenance, reliability and integrity. From my
discussions with executives in telecoms, electricity and natural gas, this
is something which preoccupies them very much. I am not sure if this
is a proper preoccupation but they are afraid that at least the mainte-
nance, reliability and integrity of networks might be aected by some of
the new competition rules which are brought in.
Transition towards more competition seems to implies increases in
game rules and litigation. Deregulation becomes synonymous with in-
creased transaction costs. In some cases, these higher transaction costs
may destroy the advantages competition was suppose to generate; the
importance of those transaction costs depends very much on the way
the competition rules have been introduced. The transition toward more
competition has been and remains a dicult undertaking but lots of the
transition costs could be avoided by a well planned course and better,
sharper and more ecient announced procedures such as global price
caps or auctions.
One last point deserves to be mentioned here. What is the likely eect
on the Canadian telecommunications industry of globalization and/or
continentalization. If we were to open the Canadian markets and let for-
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eign investors own Canadian telecommunications rms or have access to
the Canadian consumers directly, in exchange for Canadian rms having
access to foreign customers, would Canadian rms survive ? The anal-
ysis I presume would have to be developed in terms of a small market
being integrated with a large market. Let me recall that Bell Canada,
the largest telecommunications company in Canada is smaller than each
of the following: NTT, AT&T, MCI, Sprint, British Telecom, France
Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, Telecom Italia, and each one of the Re-
gional Bell Operating Companies. Hence on the international market,
it remains a junior player. I don't know how serious this is but this
was raised to me by some senior executives in dierent telecommunica-
tions rms; they fear such a market integration. Satisfying the Canadian
market could represent a relatively small incremental cost for AT&T or
other major U.S. companies. Should we let this happen or not and how
much do we want or need the Canadian industry to remain Canadian ?
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